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ABSTRACT
Machine learning models have been widely used in security ap-
plications such as intrusion detection, spam filtering, and virus or
malware detection. However, it is well-known that adversaries are
always trying to adapt their attacks to evade detection. For exam-
ple, an email spammer may guess what features spam detection
models use and modify or remove those features to avoid detection.
There has been some work on making machine learning models
more robust to such attacks. However, one simple but promising ap-
proach called randomization is underexplored. This paper proposes
a novel randomization-based approach to improve robustness of
machine learning models against evasion attacks. The proposed
approach incorporates randomization into both model training time
and model application time (meaning when the model is used to
detect attacks). We also apply this approach to random forest, an
existing ML method which already has some degree of randomness.
Experiments on intrusion detection and spam filtering data show
that our approach further improves robustness of random-forest
method. We also discuss how this approach can be applied to other
ML models.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the arrival of big data era, data mining techniques have been
widely used to build models for cyber security applications such
as spam filtering [6, 12], malware or virus detection [11, 43, 54],
and intrusion detection [1, 10, 32, 39]. However, attackers may use
a type of attacking strategy called evasion attack which modifies
their data to avoid detection. For example, an email spammer may
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modify spam emails to drop certain words or symbols and a hacker
can modify the signature of a malware or virus.
There has been studies on vulnerability of AI/ML models [35],
especially more recently on deep learning models [15, 20, 22, 36, 42].
There also has been work on building more robust mining models
against evasion attacks [2, 4, 7, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33–35, 37, 40, 46,
51, 53, 55]. Most existing work use deterministic models. However
according to theMinimumDescription Length (MDL) principle [21],
a deterministic model should be concise to avoid overfitting the
training data. However a concise model often uses a small number
of features or a small number of features may have much larger
impact on the output than other features. Attackers can modify
such features to evade detection. To understand the problem of
deterministic models, let us look at the following example.
Example 1: Let us consider an email spam filtering example. Sup-
pose the filtering software uses decision trees. Figure 1 shows sev-
eral sample decision trees (in practice decision trees will have more
nodes but here we simplify the trees to show the concept). Each
node represents the fraction of words in an email that contain a
word or symbol except for “total capital”, which represents the total
number of capitalized letters in the email.
If only one decision tree, say f1 is used, it is very easy for at-
tackers to modify a spam email to evade detection. For example,
suppose attackers have an email with feature values shown in Table
1(a). Attackers may learn that the spam filtering software looks at
the “remove” and “$” features. As a result attackers just need to
modify one feature (the percentage of $ sign in the email) to avoid
detection.
Some researchers try to use an ensemble approach (i.e., build
a number of models instead of one) [3, 5] to improve robustness
of models. However, although ensemble approach does add some
uncertainty to the generated models, it has two shortcomings: 1)
its goal is still mining quality so the models built by ensemble ap-
proach may still frequently use a small subset of features, making
it vulnerable to evasion attacks; 2) ensemble approach is still deter-
ministic at model application time, making it easier for attackers to
adapt.
To validate the first shortcoming, we ran random forest (an
ensemble method) on Spambase data set [24], which is an email
spam data set with 57 features and built 100 decision trees. Figure 2
reports for each feature (attribute), the number of trees using that
feature. 9 out of 57 features appear in at least 80% of trees and 22
features appear in at least half of trees. This means that attackers
can modify these frequently used features to change prediction
outcome.
Our contributions: To address these shortcomings, our approach
uses randomness to increase the uncertainty of models but at the
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
03
60
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 A
ug
 20
18
WOODSTOCK’97, July 1997, El Paso, Texas USA Fan Yang and Zhiyuan Chen
Remove
Spam (+:800,-:100)> 0
$
Spam (+:90, -:10)
> 0.05
Not Spam (+:100, -:900)≤ 0.05
≤ 0
(a) Model f1
!
Spam (+:800,-:100)
> 0.378
000
Spam (+:400, -:200)
> 0.25
Not Spam (+:50, -:450)≤ 0.25
≤ 0.378
(b) Model f2
$
Spam> 0.05
Total Capital
Spam> 64
Not Spam≤ 64
≤ 0.05
(c) Model f3
Figure 1: Decision tree models created by our model in Ex-
ample 1
Remove $ ! 000 Total Capital
0 0.2 0.4 0.3 100
(a) Attacker’s original spam email
Remove $ ! 000 Total Capital
0 0.05 0.4 0.3 100
(b) Modified email to trick f1 (bold as changes)
Remove $ ! 000 Total Capital
0 0.05 0.4 0.3 64
(c) Modified eamil to trick at least two models in Figure 1
Remove $ ! 000 Total Capital
0 0.05 0.378 0.25 100
(d) Modified email to trick f1 and f2
Table 1: Some possible attacks for Example 1
same time does not violate the MDL principle for each individual
model. We make the following contributions:
(1) Methods to inject randomness into model building time by
building a diverse pool of mining models. These methods
are similar to ensemble learning but optimize the tradeoff
between mining quality and robustness. These methods also
require very little modification to existing algorithms. In this
paper we used random forest as an example and showed how
to modify the training algorithm for random forest to build a
more robust model pool. We selected random forest because
it already has some degree of randomness at model building
time. However it does not optimize the tradeoff between
robustness and accuracy of models. At the end of the paper
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Figure 2: Number of trees using each feature by random for-
est on Spambase data set
we will discuss possible ways to extend our approach to
other mining methods.
(2) Methods to randomly select a subset of models at model
application time (when the model is used for detection) to
further boost robustness.
(3) A theoretical framework that bounds the minimal number of
features an attacker needs to modify given a set of selected
models.
In Example 1, suppose our method builds a pool of three decision
trees shown in Figure 1. Table 1 (c) shows the number of features
an attacker needs to modify if all three trees are used at model
application time (i.e., at least two trees need to return “not spam”).
Attackers need to modify at least two features now (using f1 alone
just needs one modification).
Our method further boosts robustness by adding randomness at
model application time. For example, if all three trees are used in
Figure 1. As shown in Table 1 (c), attackers only need to modify two
features to avoid detection. However if we select f1 and f2 (or f2
and f3) at model application time and the spam filtering software
will only label the email “not spam” if both trees return “not spam”,
attackers have to modify at least three features as shown in Table 1
(d).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
related work. Section 3 introduces some background information
and gives an overview of our approach. Section 4 describes how
our approach can be applied to random forest. Section 5 presents a
theoretical framework to bound adversaries’ cost. Section 6 presents
experimental results. Section ?? discusses how our approach can
be extended to other mining models and Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
Next we briefly describe related work in the literature. The work
can be roughly divided into five categories.
The first category of work studies attacks against conventional
mining models. Barreno et al. described a taxonomy of attacks and
briefly mentions a few possible defense strategies [2]. Lowd and
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Meek [35] studied an adversarial classifier reverse engineering al-
gorithm to learn the models of a given learning algorithm. They
assume that the adversary can find out the outcome of a prediction
model by sending instances to the model. Attacks on intrusion de-
tection are discussed in [16]. Vulnerability of biometric systems are
studied in [17, 50]. Tramer et al. studied attacks that steal machine
learning models based on output of such models [48].
The second category of work tries to find robust learning algo-
rithms in presence of attacks. A common approach is to model the
learning problem as an optimization problem [14, 30, 47]. The gain
of attackers is modeled as an additional term in the objective func-
tion along with the original objectives. This approach is especially
suitable for linear classifiers because they have simple objective
functions. Globerson and Roweis [18] studied the problem of build-
ing a robust SVM classifier in presence of feature deletion attacks
(attackers can delete up to a certain number of features from the test
data). The proposed method adds an additional term as the worst
case accuracy loss caused by deletion attacks to the standard SVM’s
objective function and uses quadratic programming to solve the
problem. Another adversarial learning method is proposed for SVM
in [56], which considers two possible settings for attackers, in one
of them the attackers can corrupt data without any restriction and
in the other one the attackers have costs associated with attacks.
Kolcz and Teo [29] proposed a simple feature weighting scheme
for SVM and logistic regression.
The third category of work applies game theory to the adversarial
learning problem. Typically the problem is modeled as a two-player
and multi-stage game between the data miner and the adversary.
At each stage, the adversary tries to find the best possible attacks
and the data miner adjusts the mining models to such attacks.
Kearns and Li [28] proposed a theoretical upper bound on tolerable
malicious error rates. Dalvi et al. [13] proposed a game theory
framework which models the data miner and the adversary as a two
player game. They assume that both players have perfect knowledge
(i.e., data miner knows the adversary’s attacking strategy and the
adversary knows the mining model). Several other works [8, 9, 27,
34] model the adversarial learning problem as a Stackelberg game.
The fourth category of work focuses on vulnerabilities of deep
neural nets [15, 20, 22, 36, 42]. Most of these studies focus on image
classification and they have shown that adversarial examples can
effectively fool a neural network to misclassify a slightly modified
image. There has been some effort to make deep neural nets more
robust [19, 31, 37], where most of them retrain the neural nets
with added adversarial examples. However most of such work still
focuses on images. Image-based methods operate in a continuous
feature space so theymay not be directly applicable to cyber security
applications which contain a lot of discrete attributes (e.g., words
in emails or network protocol for intrusion detection data). To the
best of our knowledge, the only exception is [20], where Grosse et
al. have studied how to generate adversarial examples for malware
classification and use these examples to retrain a deep neural net.
Most of existing methods in these four categories use determin-
istic mining models. As we mentioned before, based on the MDL
principle, deterministic models should be concise to avoid overfit-
ting. This makes them vulnerable to attacks. We propose to use
non-deterministic models to address this shortcoming.
The final category of work use ensemble methods in adversarial
settings [23, 38, 41, 44, 49]. For example, Biggio et al. [5] used two
methods: random subspace (a random subset of features are used
for training each model) and bagging (a random sample of training
data is used for training each model).
Although these methods are similar to our approach, they do not
consider the problem of optimizing the tradeoff between mining
quality and robustness, which is the focus of our approach. These
solutions also only consider the model building time, and we will
inject randomness into model application time as well.
The only work we are aware of that uses randomization at model
application time is [52], where the authors considered an optimal
strategy when the system can use several classifiers. They found the
optimal solution is either to choose a classifier uniformly at random
or choose the classifier with the smallest error depending on the
relative importance between accuracy vs. robustness. However, this
work does not consider how to create these classifiers and does
not test their approach on real data sets. We propose a method to
build more diverse pool of models and a clustering-based method
to select these models at model application time. We also test our
solution on real data sets.
3 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF OUR
APPROACH
We first introduce some notations. LetL be a data mining algorithm
and T = {(xi ,yi )}Ni=1 be a set of N training samples where xi =(xi1, . . . ,xim ) is a training instance withm independent variables
(or features)A1, . . . ,Am and xi j is the value ofAj in xi , andyi is the
value of dependent variableY for xi . LetM be the number of models
in the model pool. We will build a pool P = { f1(x), . . . ,fM (x)} of
prediction models where each fi (x) is a model to predict the value
of Y for record x . At model application time, we will select a subset
of P for prediction.
Threat Model: This paper focuses on evasion attacks where at-
tackers can observe the prediction outcome of the detection model
and modify their attacking instances accordingly to avoid detection,
but cannot tamper with the model and training data directly (also
called exploratory integrity attacks in [2]).
Such attacks are quite common in practice. For example, Huang
et al. [25] found that many attackers are checking whether their
malware will be detected by malware scanning software by upload-
ing their malware programs on scanning sites such as VirusTotal
and keep modifying their malware until they are not detected.
We will consider two cases for attackers’ knowledge.
Definition 1. Complete knowledge of model pool: Attackers know
the models being built over training data and can modify their at-
tacking instances based on their knowledge.
Definition 2. Incomplete knowledge of model pool: Attackers do
not know the models being built over training data, but can guess
what features may be considered important.
The incomplete knowledge case is more common in practice.
The complete knowledge case often occurs if attackers are insiders.
Definition 3. Attackers’ cost function: attackers have a cost c(xi ,x ′i )
of modifying an instance xi into x ′i . In this paper we assume that
the cost function is a weighted sum of cost of modifying each feature,
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Figure 3: Decision tree models created by our model in Ex-
ample 1
i.e., c(xi ,x ′i ) =
∑m
j=1 c jdist(xi j ,x ′i j ) where xi j is the j-th feature of x ,
dist is a distance measure between the j-th feature of xi and x ′i and
c j is a weight.
For example, ifdist(xi j ,x ′i j ) is squared distance, c(xi ,x ′i ) is square
of weighted Euclidean distance. In cases such as email spam detec-
tion, attackers can drop or add certain words to their spam emails.
So we can set dist(xi j ,x ′i j ) to be the indicator function, i.e., it equals
one if xi j , x ′i j and zero otherwise. The cost is now sum of weights
of modified features (weight is c j ). c j can be set using domain knowl-
edge. For example, if a feature is difficult to modify or it is crucial
for the gain of attackers, c j should be large.
Figure 3 shows the architecture of our approach. Given a train-
ing data set T and a data mining algorithm L, our approach first
generates a model pool using randomization. When user provides
an instance z to classify, a random selection process will be used to
select a subset of models from the model pool to return a prediction
for z. Next we show how our approach can be applied to random
forest method.
4 OUR SOLUTION TO RANDOM-FOREST
Random forest method builds a pool of decision trees. Each decision
tree is built on a random sample of training data (this is called bag-
ging). When building the decision tree, a feature will be selected at
each split based on some splitting criteria such as information gain.
Unlike traditional decision tree building algorithms, random forest
selects the splitting feature from a random subset of all features
(this is called random subspace).
Bagging and random subspace increase uncertainty at training
time. However, random forest does not consider robustness of mod-
els against evasion attacks when selecting splitting feature. As
shown in Figure 2, a few features appear in majority of trees built
by random forest, making them easy target to evasion attack. We
developed a Weighted Random Forest algorithm (Section 4.1) to
address this issue. The key idea is to penalize features with high
vulnerability (or more frequent appearance) such that features are
used more uniformly in different trees. We also propose a cluster-
ing based method to add randomness at model application time
(Section 4.2).
4.1 Weighted Random Forest Method
Algorithm 1:Weighted Random Forest Method
Input :Training data set T = {(xi ,yi )}Ni=1, number of
modelsM , feature subset size F
Output :A set of candidate models f1, . . . , fM
1 Compute weightsw1, . . . ,wm for each feature
2 for i = 1 toM do
3 Draw a uniform random sample with replacement of size
N from T , let the sample be Ti
4 Build a decision tree fi onTi where at each node a random
subset of F features are used and the splitting criteria for
each feature Aj is multiplied by weightw j
5 end
6 return f1, . . . , fM
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code of the Weighted Random
Forest algorithm. The algorithm is the same as random forest except
that when the algorithm selects a feature to split, the splitting
criteria of each featureAi is multiplied by a weightwi . This weight
will be used to optimize the tradeoff between mining quality and
robustness.
We compute the weights based on the following two observa-
tions. First, features with higher modification cost should receive
higher weights. Second, if modifying a feature is likely to change
the classification outcome of a positive (malicious) instance to nega-
tive (benign), then this feature should have a lower weight. We call
such features vulnerable features and use a metric called differential
ratio to quantify vulnerability of a feature.
Differential Ratio: One observation is that a vulnerable feature is
often very useful in distinguishing positive instances from negative
instances. Thus measures such as information gain could be used
to measure vulnerability.
However we found that such measures are mainly for classifi-
cation accuracy, and they do not precisely capture vulnerability
at times. So we proposed an alternative metric called differential
ratio to quantify vulnerability. We start by considering binary trees,
and then explain the difference between differential ratio and in-
formation gain, and finally generalize our solution to multi-branch
trees.
Let p+(nl ) be the fraction of positive training instances in the
subtree rooted at node n’s left child and p+(nr ) be the fraction of
positive instances in the subtree rooted at its right child. Let |n | be
the total number of training instances in the subtree rooted at node
n and |T | be the total number of training instances. Let An be the
splitting feature used at node n. We calculate a differential ratio for
feature An at n as
d(An ,n) = |p+(nl ) − p+(nr )|
|n |
|T | (1)
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Next we explain the intuition behind Equation 1. Let x be a
positive instance that falls under the subtree rooted at n. Modifying
the splitting feature ofnmay changex ′s classification outcome from
positive to negative. Now we try to estimate the probability of this
change. We assume that test cases will follow similar distribution as
the training cases (this is the basis for all data mining algorithms).
Thus we can estimate the probability of a test case reaching node n
by |n ||T | . Since the test case is positive, it is more likely belonging to
the child node with higher fraction of positive cases. Without loss
of generality we assume that the left child has higher fraction of
positive cases. Let An be the splitting feature at node n. Modifying
An will move x from left child to right child. We use p+(nl ) to
approximate the probability of x classified as positive in the left
child, and p+(nr ) to approximate the same probability in right child.
So the probability of x being classified as negative after modifying
An can be estimated by p+(nl )(1 − p+(nr )).
However this measure has two problems: 1) it is not symmetric;
2) it is greater than zero even if the right child has higher fraction
of positive instances (so moving x to right child will not help the
attackers). So instead we use |p+(nl ) − p+(nr )| which is both sym-
metric and indicates that x is more vulnerable when one of its child
has much higher fraction of positive instances than the other child
(so moving x to the other child helps attackers).
Difference with Information Gain: Information gain for node
n is defined in Equation 2
IG(n) = H (n) − ( |nl ||n | H (nl ) +
|nr |
|n | H (nr )) (2)
Here H (n), H (nl ), and H (nr ) are entropy for node n, its left child
nl and right child nr , respectively. There are two main differences
between information gain and differential ratio: 1) information
gain considers original class distribution (H (n)), differential ratio
does not; 2) information gain considers size of each child node (the
entropy of each child node is weighted by size), differential ratio
does not.
Figure 1 shows the difference between differential ratio and in-
formation gain. The numbers in parenthesis are number of positive
or negative instances in each node. The differential ratio for the “$”
node in tree f1 equals |0.1 − 0.9| 11002000 = 0.88, and the differential
ratio for the “000” node in tree f2 is |0.1 − 0.67| 11002000 = 0.62. So
the first one has higher differential ratio. However, if we compute
information gain (IG), IG for “$” node is 0.19 and IG for “000” node
is 0.26. So the second node has higher IG. The reason is that infor-
mation gain considers entropy before the split as well as each child
node’s size, while differential ratio only considers the difference of
fraction of positive instances in two child nodes. Here the “$” node
has one child with mostly positive instances and the other with
mostly negative instances, so modifying “$” feature is more likely
to change a positive instance to a negative instance. On the other
hand, the higher IG for “000” is mostly due to the higher entropy
before the split, which is not directly related to vulnerability.
Weighting Scheme:We then define a featureAj ’s differential ratio
in a pool of trees as the sum of ratio in each tree divided byM (total
number of trees), where the ratio in each tree is the maximal ratio
of all nodes having Aj as splitting attribute, i.e.,
d(Aj ,P) =
∑
f ∈P
∑
n∈f ,n splits on Aj maxd(Aj ,n)
M
(3)
Here we take the maximal ratio in a tree so we consider the most
vulnerable case for a featureAj (i.e., the worst case). Since this ratio
depends on a model pool P, we can run the original random forest
(not weighted one) once to create a model pool P0 and calculate
the ratio based on P0. We then compute weightw j for feature Aj
as
w(Aj ) = e−r
d (Aj ,P0)
c (Aj ) (4)
Here c(Aj ) is the cost of modifying Aj and P0 is the pool built
by random forest. If we know all data instances (xi ) attackers have
and their attacking strategy (i.e., x ′i ), we can compute exact c(Aj ).
However in practice such information is not available. So we can
approximate that cost with c j (i.e., the weight for Aj in Definition
3). r is a parameter to adjust the importance of robustness. If r = 0,
w(Aj ) = 1 for all features and our method is identical to random
forest. For a positive r value, the weight of a feature increases with
the cost of modifying that feature and decreases with the differential
ratio. So our method favors features that have higher cost or are
less vulnerable.
The exponential function in Equation 4 is used for smoothing.
For example, if a feature A1 has a differential ratio of 0.53 and a
feature A2 has a differential ratio of 0.01, suppose both features
have cost of 1. Without the exponential function the weight of
A2 will be 53 times of that of A1. This may penalize feature A1
too much because features with high differential ratio are often
features that can better distinguish positive instances from negative
instances. With the exponential function the weight for A1 is 0.45
and weight for A2 is 0.98 when r = 1.5. We will discuss how to
choose appropriate value of r in Section 6.
Generalization tomulti-branch trees: To generalize differential
ratio to multiple-branch trees, we divide children of a node n into
two groups. The first group consists of child nodes with majority as
positive training instances, and the second group consists of nodes
with majority as negative training instances (if one of the groups is
empty then differential ratio of n is zero). Let p+(n+) be the fraction
of positive instances in the first group and p+(n−) be the fraction of
positive instances in the second group. We define differential ratio
for feature An at node n as
d(An ,n) = |p+(n+) − p+(n−)| |n ||T | (5)
We then use this differential ratio in Equation 3 and 4.
Computational complexity:The cost of random forest isO(mMN logN )
wherem is number of features, N is number of training instances
and M is number of models. WRF builds models twice (the first
pass to generate P0 without the weighting scheme and the second
pass with the weighting scheme). Once P0 is generated, comput-
ing differential ratio just needs to traverse each tree in P0 and
costs O(max | f |M) where max | f | is the maximal number of nodes
in a tree. Normally N >> max | f |, so the complexity of WRF is
O(mMN logN ).
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4.2 Clustering-based Model Selection at Model
Application Stage
At model application stage we can dynamically select a subset of
models for each test case such that it is even harder for attackers to
find out what models are used. However, the mining quality is also
very important and for ensemble methods such as random forest
using too few models often leads to poor mining quality. So we
need to balance robustness and mining quality at model application
time as well.
We propose a clustering-based model selection method (shown
in Algorithm 2). This method is based on the observation that if
two trees share very few common features then they should be
robust to evasion attacks because attackers need to modify more
features.
Algorithm 2: Clustering-based Model Selection Algorithm
Input :A model pool P = { f1, . . . , fM }, parameters s ,q, and
a test case t
Output :A subset of models to classify t
1 Creates a similarity graph G = (V ,E) where node v ∈ V is a
tree in P and two nodes are linked by an edge e if they share
common features and e’s weight is the sum of differential
ratio of shared features
2 Use spectral clustering to create s clusters
3 At model application time, randomly select q models per
cluster and return them
The algorithm first creates a similarity graph where each node
is a tree in P and two nodes are linked if they share common
features and the weight of the link is the sum of differential ratio of
shared features. It then uses spectral clustering to divide the models
into s clusters such that there are few between cluster links. The
clustering step can be done offline. At model application time, for
each test case, the clustering method randomly selects q models
from each cluster. These qs models will be used to classify this test
case. Note that different models will be used to classify different test
cases. Since models in different clusters share very few common
features, the selected models also share fewer common features
than the original model pool. We will discuss how to empirically
select q and s in Section 6.
LetM be the number of trees andm be the number of features.
It takes O(mM2) time to build the similarity graph. The cost of
spectral clustering is O(M3). So the computational complexity of
the clustering-based method is O(M3 +mM2). Note that this cost
is not related to number of instances.
The clustering-based algorithm can use models generated by
our weighted (WRF) algorithm. We call the combined algorithm
Cluster-based Weighted Random Forest (CWRF).
5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We propose a theoretical framework to provide a lower bound
to attackers’ effort. We will consider the case when the distance
function dist in Definition 3 is indicator function because it is easier
to reason with. In addition, in many real life applications such as
spam filtering, indicator function is appropriate. So the cost of
modifying a set of features in a set SA equals
∑
Aj ∈SA c j . We start
with a theoretical bound for random forest. In Appendix ?? we will
generalize it to other mining methods. We first introduce some
notations.
Definition 4. Let f be a decision tree to detect whether data
instance x is positive or negative as a cyber security threat (e.g., a
spam, an intrusion, or a fraud). A critical path of f is a root-to-leaf
path p with nodes n1,n2, . . . ,n |p | where n |p | is a leaf node with
positive label.
It is clear that any instance labeled positive must lie on one of
the critical paths (actually at the leaf node) and to turn such an
instance into negative, attackers need to modify some features on
the critical path.
Definition 5. Critical count CC(Aj ) for a feature Aj in a set of
models P = { f1, . . . , fM } equals the number of trees in P that have
Aj on at least one critical path.
For example, in Example 1, the critical count for “$” is two be-
cause it appears in critical paths in f1 and f3. The critical count for
the remaining features is all one because each only appears in one
tree’s critical paths. Next we give the bound.
Theorem 1. A poolP = { f1(x),. . . ,fM (x)} of decision trees satis-
fies (t1, t2,k)-robustness if for any set SA ofk features,∑Aj ∈SACC(Aj ) ≤
t1 and total modification cost
∑
Aj ∈SA c j ≥ t2. So for any positive
data instance x with current positive vote (i.e., number of trees label-
ing x as positive) greater or equal to ⌈M/2⌉ + t1, an attacker needs to
modify more than k features or pay more than t2 modification cost to
let x avoid detection by P.
The proof is quite straightforward. Suppose x is classified as
positive by a tree f . To modify x such that f will classify x as
negative, an attacker must modify some feature on critical paths
of f . Since CC(Ai ) is the number of trees with feature Ai on their
critical paths, modifying Ai can reduce the positive vote count by
at mostCC(Ai ). Since the sum of any k features’ critical count is at
most t1, the change in positive vote count by modifying k features
is at most t1. Since the current positive vote count is no less than
⌈M/2⌉+t1, the new count is at least ⌈M/2⌉ after changingk features.
Thus x will be still classified as positive. Since we need to modify
more than k features to change the outcome, the modification cost
is at least t2 because changing k features already costs at least t2.
For example, let P = { f1, f2} in Figure 1, the maximal critical
count for each feature is one, so P satisfies (1, c∗, 1)-robustness
where c∗ is the minimal c j among those features. According to
Theorem 1, for any instance with positive vote 2 (e.g., the original
instance shown in Table 1 (a)), the attacker needs to change at least
2 features to avoid detection. This bound is also tight because for a
test case with feature “Remove” = 0, “$” = 0.2, “!” = 0.2, and “0000”
= 0.3, attackers just need to change “$” to 0.05 and “000” to 0.25 to
change the prediction of both f1 and f2 from spam to not spam.
Theorem 1 provides a worst-case bound. However in practice
the performance is usually better because not every modification
of a feature on a critical path will lead to change of classification
outcome. For instance, for the first test case in Table 1 (a), attackers
need to modify three features instead of two for model set { f1, f2}
as shown in Table 1 (d). The differential ratio proposed in Equation
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3 can be seen as a more realistic estimation of robustness but it
does not give worst case bound.
Worst-case bound after clustering: The clustering-based model
selection method also provides a worst-case bound. If each feature
does not appear in more than l clusters, then the critical count of
each feature is no more than lq because we only select q models per
cluster. So the total critical count of k features will not exceed klq.
The selected models satisfy (klq, c∗,k)-robustness where c∗ is the
minimal sum of c j of k features. For example, suppose in Figure 1
the trees are divided into two clusters, the first cluster with tree f1
and f3 and the second with tree f2. Each feature only shows up in
one cluster, i.e., l = 1. We also select one model per cluster so q = 1.
So the selected models (say f1 and f2) satisfy (1, c∗, 1)-robustness
and by Theorem 1 attackers need to modify at least 2 features for
any instance with two positive votes.
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents experimental evaluation of our proposed
methods. Section 6.1 describes setup of our experiment. Section
6.2 discusses how we tune parameters of proposed methods and
Section 6.3 compares proposed methods to existing ones.
6.1 Setup
Algorithms:We compare the following algorithms:
(1) WRF: this is the proposed weighted algorithm in Algorithm
1 without the clustering step.
(2) CWRF: this is the proposed algorithm with both feature
weighting at model building time and cluster-based model
selection (in Algorithm 2) at model application time.
(3) IG: this method is a variant of the proposed WRF method.
The only difference is that IG replaces differential ratio with
information gain in Equation 4. Note that IG is different from
random forest because features with high information gain
are penalized by having lower weights according to Equation
4.
(4) RF: this is the original random forest algorithm. RF can be
seen as a special case of WRF when r = 0 (i.e., weights are
uniform).
(5) C4.5. This method builds a single decision tree model.
(6) avg-LR: this method uses random subspace to build a num-
ber of logistic regression models and computes the average
weight of each feature in these models as the weight for the
overall model [29]. It was the method with the best perfor-
mance as reported in [29]. This method injects randomness
at model building time but differs from our method on three
aspects: 1) it does not optimize tradeoff between accuracy
and robustness; 2) it does not inject randomness in model
application time; 3) it uses logistic regression rather than
random forest.
Data sets:We used the Spambase data set (an email spam data set)
from UCI Machine Learning Repository [24] and network traffic
data from Kyoto University’s Honeypot (an intrusion detection data
set) [45]. For the Kyoto University data set, we randomly selected a
sample of 45,390 instances from data collected in December 2015.
Since the original data set is quite skewed (with mostly normal
traffic), we under-sampled normal traffic data and kept about half
sample normal and half attacks. We also removed duplicates from
the data set. We call this sampled data set Kyoto-Sample. Details of
these data sets can be found in Table 2. Spambase only contains
numerical features. Kyoto University data has both numerical and
categorical features.
Features for Spambase data are mainly frequency of words and
symbols as well as length of sequence of capital letters. For Kyoto
University data set we only used features extracted from raw traf-
fic data such as duration of connection, number of bytes sent by
source IP. Attackers can easily modify features in both data sets.
E.g., attackers can add or drop a word or symbol or capital letter
sequences in a spam email for Spambase and modify the number
of bytes sent by source IP for Kyoto data set.
For Spambase, we randomly selected 70% of data for training and
the remaining for testing. For Kyoto-Sample, we randomly selected
10 days of data for training and the remaining for testing.
Data set Number of Number of Number
instances features of positive
instances
Spambase 4,601 57 1813
Kyoto-Sample 45,390 14 22,687
Table 2: Characteristics of data sets
Attacking strategies: For simplicity we assume that all features
have uniform modification cost and distance function between two
feature values dist(xi j ,x ′i j ) to be the indicator function so attackers’
effort will be minimized if they need to modify the smallest number
of features.
We simulated two simple but yet effective attacking strategies in
our experiments: one for incomplete knowledge and the other for
complete knowledge. These attacking strategies are not necessarily
used in practice but we find they are quite effective against existing
machine learning models. So we use them to compare our proposed
methods with existing methods.
Both attacking strategies use a random probing phase to learn
the optimal attacking order over features. For example, in Figure 1,
the optimal order is to modify the feature “$” first because this may
change the result of two out of three models. In attacking phase,
attackers use the learned order to launch evasion attacks.
We assume that attackers have obtained a set of instances for
its probing and this set is called probing set. A probing set should
contain both positive (malicious) instances and negative (benign)
instances. Positive instances are used for probing and negative
instances are used to modify feature values. The probing set does
not have to overlap with the training data used to build the machine
learning models but it should follow similar distribution.
For Spambase, we randomly divide test set into two halves. We
assume that attackers will use the first half as probing set and the
remaining half for launching attacks based on learned strategy. For
Kyoto-Sample, we randomly selected 7 days of data in test set as
probing set and the remaining to launch attacks.
In the probing phase, attackers randomly select a positive in-
stance in its probing set and send it to the machine learning model
and check whether the mining model will reject the instance (i.e.,
labeled as positive).
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If the instance is rejected, attackers replace a randomly selected
feature’s value with the mean value of that feature in negative
instances in the probing set. For example, in Figure 1, attackers can
reduce the number of “$” in the spam email such that its frequency
equals the frequency in non spam emails. The modified instance
is resent to the mining model. This process continues until the
instance is accepted. Attackers record the last modified feature Al
because classification outcome changes from positive to negative as
a result of modifying Al . Note that a feature Ai modified before the
last feature may contribute to the success of attack as well. However,
we choose to be conservative here because we are uncertain about
this.
After probing a certain number of positive instances, attackers
sort recorded features by their frequencies in descending order. In
both data sets, we varied number of probed positive instances from
50 to 200 and found little difference in results. This means attackers
can learn an effective attacking strategy quite quickly. We report
results when 50 positive instances are probed.
In the attacking phase, attackers modify each positive instance
in the attacking set one feature at a time in the order obtained
after probing and stop when the modified instance is classified as
negative. The attacking strategy for the complete knowledge case is
the same as incomplete knowledge case except that attackers probe
the whole set of positive test cases (including those used to launch
actual attack) in the probing phase because attackers already know
the machine learning model and can test them locally.
Interestingly, this random probing strategy is better than other
strategies we tried (including a greedy strategy that selects features
that lead to maximal decrease of positive votes for random forest),
maybe because the former is less likely to get stuck in local maxima.
Metrics: We consider two cases when measuring robustness of
a machine learning model. In the first case, attackers can modify
up to k features per instance where k is a parameter. We call this
case bounded cost because attackers’ cost is bounded by k . We mea-
sure attackers’ success rate as the percentage of modified positive
instances used in the attacking phase that are eventually labeled
negative by the machine learning model. Clearly, the lower the
success rate, the more robust the model.
In the second case, attackers can modify as many features as
they want until each positive instance used in the attacking phase
is labeled negative by the machine learning model. We call this
case unbounded cost case. We compute average number of modified
features in this case. The higher the average, the more robust the
model.
To measure mining quality, we used true positive rate and false
positive rate.We found that in our experiments false positive rate for
all algorithms in all settings is always below 10%. So we only report
results for true positive rate. Since there is some randomness in
mining algorithms and attacking strategies, we ran each experiment
20 times and took the average of results.
All experiments were run on a desktop computer with Intel i7
quad core processor, 32 GB RAM, 2 TB hard disk, and running
Windows 7. All algorithms were implemented in Java by extending
source code for Weka 3.8.
6.2 Tuning of Parameters
We need to set three parameters for our proposed WRF and CWRF
methods: 1) r which is used in Equation 4 to adjust the tradeoff
between robustness and mining quality; 2) s as the number of
clusters for CWRF; 3) q as the number of models selected at model
application time from each cluster of models.
We found that the optimal r value is the same for both bounded
and unbounded cost cases. Results for complete and incomplete
knowledge also have similar trends so we only report results for in-
complete knowledge and unbounded cost. As mentioned in Section
6.1, average number of modified features is used to measure robust-
ness to evasion attacks in case of unbounded cost. Figure 4 and
Figure 6 report true positive rate for Spambase and Kyoto-Sample
with incomplete knowledge, respectively. Figure 5 and Figure 7
report average number of modified features for each data set. We
reported results for WRF, CWRF, and IG because all these methods
use r .
The results showed that when r is very small, all methods have
high true positive rate (i.e., good mining quality). This is expected
because more weights are put on mining quality. As r increases, the
average number of modified features increases and true positive
rate decreases slightly.
However as r becomes too large, the average number of modified
features becomes flat and even starts to decline. The reason is that
for very large r values, the weights for vulnerable features are so
low such that other features that are previously not vulnerable may
have higher weights and become vulnerable (i.e., used frequently
in models). The optimal r value is around 1.5 for Spambase. The
optimal r for Kyoto-Sample is higher (around 4.0), probably because
this data set has fewer features and some of them are extremely
vulnerable so a larger r value is needed to achieve desired robust-
ness level. In practice, users should start with small r values and
gradually increase it until average number of modified features or
mining quality starts to drop significantly.
We also observe that all three methods have similar true positive
rates and their true positive rates are almost identical on Kyoto-
Sample. In terms of average number of modified features, CWRF
has the highest numbers on Spambase, meaning it is the most robust
among these three methods. This is expected because CWRF adds
randomness to bothmodel training time andmodel application time.
All three methods have similar average number of modified features
for Kyoto-Sample, possibly due to fewer features in Kyoto-Sample.
We considered four combinations of s and q: s = 5 or 10 (i.e.,
models are divided into 5 or 10 clusters) and q = 1 or 5 (1 or 5
models are selected per cluster). Again we found the optimal value
for s and q is the same for both bounded and unbounded cost cases
as well as for incomplete and complete knowledge cases so we
only report results for unbounded cost and incomplete knowledge.
Figure 8 reports true positive rate and Figure 9 reports average
number of modified features for both data sets.
The results show that as s and q increases, true positive rate
increases as well because more models are used in prediction. How-
ever the average number of modified features decreases in most
cases as s and q increase because using more models means less
uncertainty and less robustness. For Spambase, the decrease in true
positive rate is quite significant as s and q decrease so the optimal
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setting is using 10 clusters and selecting 5 models per cluster. For
Kyoto-Sample data set, true positive rate is not very sensitive to
s and q. So we use 5 clusters and select 5 models from each clus-
ter (s = 5,q = 5) because it gives the highest average number of
modified features. In practice, users can start with large s and q and
gradually decrease them until true positive rate starts to degrade
significantly.
6.3 Comparison with Existing Methods
Once we set parameters for our algorithms (WRF and CWRF), we
compare them to existing methods (RF, C4.5, avg-LR, and IG). We
first consider bounded cost case and vary k (number of features
attackers can modify). Figure 10 and Figure 11 report attackers’ suc-
cess rate for Spambase with incomplete and complete knowledge,
respectively. Figure 12 and Figure 13 report the results for Kyoto-
Sample. Note that true positive rate does not depend on attackers’
actions, so true positive rate for bounded and unbounded cost cases
are the same. Figure 14 and Figure 16 report true positive rate for
Spambase and Kyoto-Sample, respectively.
As k increases, attackers’ success rate for all methods increases.
This is expected because attackers can modify more features for
larger k . For all methods attackers also have higher success rate
with complete knowledge case than with incomplete knowledge.
This is also expected because attackers can launch more effective
attacks if they know more. Due to small number of features (only
14 in total), all methods have higher success rate on Kyoto-Sample
data set, especially for large k values.
The results show that CWRF has the lowest success rate for
attackers for most cases, meaning it is the most robust method. The
improvement on robustness is quite significant in most cases. For
example, on Spambase attackers’ success rate is 64% when k = 4
using random forest. Using CWRF attackers success rate is reduced
to 35%. On Kyoto-Sample attackers’ success rate is 95% when k = 3
using random forest and using CWRF the success rate is reduced
to 55%.
Figure 14 and Figure 16 also show that true positive rate for
CWRF and WRF is quite close to that of random forest. So the
improvement of robustness does not come at significant cost of
detection rate.
The results also show that WRF has the second lowest success
rate for attackers and beats IG in most cases except for complete
knowledge case on Kyoto-Sample where IG andWRF have the same
performance. WRF uses differential ratio and IG uses information
gain at model training time. This verifies the observation in Section
4.1 that information gain is often inferior to differential privacy in
measuring vulnerability. CWRF is better than WRF because CWRF
also injects randomness into model application time.
RF has lower success rate for attackers than C4.5 on Spambase.
On Kyoto-Sample the results are mixed as RF is better for small
k values but worse than C4.5 for large k values. This shows that
adding randomness to model building time helps robustness in
general but more can be done as demonstrated by the results of
CWRF.
The results for avg-LR are always worse than CWRF and WRF.
Avg-LR does use randomness at model building time but it neither
uses randomness at model application time nor optimizes tradeoff
between mining quality and robustness (it still uses conventional
logistic regression when building each model).
For unbounded cost case, Figure 15 and Figure 17 report aver-
age number of modified features for Spambase and Kyoto-Sample,
respectively. CWRF has the highest average number of modified
features (i.e., highest attackers’ effort) for Spambase, followed by
WRF, avg-LR, and IG. The improvement of CWRF over RF is quite
significant. For example, in incomplete knowledge case attackers
need to modify on average 4.1 features to evade detection from RF
but need to modify 8.9 features to evade detection from CWRF.
For Kyoto-Sample, IG, CWRF, andWRF have the highest average
number of modified features. The difference between these three
methods is quite small. One possible reason is that Kyoto-Sample
has fewer features so all models have a lot of overlapping features
and clustering becomes less effective. Still the results of CWRF
are significantly better than that of random forest. For example, in
incomplete knowledge case attackers need to modify on average 2.8
features to evade detection from RF but need to modify 4.0 features
(there are only 14 features in total) to evade detection from CWRF.
Scalability:We extracted 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% as well as the full set
of Kyoto data set collected in December 2015 (with 7,565,246 million
instances in total) to test the scalability of CWRF. Figure 18 reports
the execution time of CWRF. The results show that CWRF scales
linearly with number of rows. We also found that the execution
time is dominated by model building time (clustering time is less
than 10 seconds). As future work we will investigate how to further
improve efficiency of our methods.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes an approach to use randomization to improve
robustness of machine learning models in cyber security applica-
tions. Our approach injects randomness into both model training
time and model application time and carefully balances robustness
and mining quality. We applied our approach to random forest and
experiments on an email spam data set and a network intrusion
detection data set show our approach significantly improves ro-
bustness of random forest models without sacrificing much mining
quality. We also discuss some ideas of how to extend our approach
to other mining methods. For future work it will be interesting to
study effectiveness of these extensions. We also made a number
of simplified assumptions in our experiments (e.g., uniform cost
of modifying each feature). In future work we will study results
in more realistic settings, e.g., with different cost of modifying
each feature and some features cannot be modified (e.g., the part of
malware that carries out the attack).
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Figure 4: True positive rate when varying r on Spambase (in-
complete knowledge)
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Figure 5: Average Number of Modified Features when varying
r on Spambase (incomplete knowledge)
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Figure 6: True positive rate when varying r on Kyoto-Sample
(incomplete knowledge)
0 1 2 3 4 50
1
2
3
4
5
r value
Av
er
ag
e
N
um
be
ro
fM
od
ifi
ed
Fe
at
ur
es
WRF
CWRF
IG
Figure 7: Average Number of Modified Features when vary-
ing r on Kyoto-Sample (incomplete knowledge)
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Figure 8: True positive rate varying s and q (incomplete
knowledge)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Spambase Kyoto‐sample
A v
e r
a g
e
N u
m
b e
r o
f M
o d
i f i
e d
F e
a t
u r
e s (s=5,q=1) (s=5,q=5)
(s=10,q=1) (s=10,q=5)
Figure 9: AverageNumber ofModified Features varying s and
q (incomplete knowledge)
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Figure 10: Attackers’ success rate when varying k on Spam-
base (incomplete knowledge)
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Figure 11: Attackers’ success rate when varying k on Spam-
base (complete knowledge)
WOODSTOCK’97, July 1997, El Paso, Texas USA Fan Yang and Zhiyuan Chen
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 2 3 4 5
S u
c c
e s
s R
a t
e
k
C4.5 IG avg‐LR
RF WRF CWRF
Figure 12: Attackers’ success rate when varying k on Kyoto-
Sample (incomplete knowledge)
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Figure 13: Attackers’ success rate when varying k on Kyoto-
Sample (complete knowledge)
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Figure 14: True positive rate on Spambase
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Figure 15: Average Number of Modified Features on Spam-
base
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Figure 16: True positive rate on Kyoto-Sample
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Figure 17: Average Number of Modified Features on Kyoto-
Sample
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Figure 18: Execution time of CWRF over fraction of Kyoto De-
cember 2015 data
